Once again, we're aiming to fight half a war
When did we become so militarily stupid? When did we forget that the object of fighting a war is to win, not to tie? Is it an outgrowth of the non-competitive, everyone-gets-a-trophy mentality we're trying to teach our children?
Earlier this week, President Obama announced an increase in the number of troops we'll be sending to Afghanistan, but he also announced that they'll be there for a limited time. To me, it sounds like we're throwing away lives because we have to be seen as trying to do something, but we're going to limit those losses calendrically. It's like saying to the enemy, "Okay, we're going to fight. But if you can hold us off for this long, you win."
He used the term "nation building", of which Washington seems to have grown fond. It makes for a nice analogy, when you consider home building. But it would work better if the political cognoscenti using it actually thought about building a house.
What happens when you decide to build a house? First, you plan, hire an architect, design what it will look like, make sure the infrastructure is there (roads, sewers, electricity, etc.), and that the new materials and labor are available. And once the planning is done, then what? Then you clear the land—cut down trees that are in the way, remove inconvenient boulders, and dig a hole for the foundation. And, if there's already a ramshackle house on the property—something with holes in the roof, that's falling down, and that you really didn't want to live in in the first place—you knock it down. You don't say "I like this bedroom, so I'll keep it, and this foyer is nice, and I like that six-foot section of the basement." You knock down the whole thing, clear the land (just like erasing a blackboard before starting a new lesson), and start fresh.
Analogizing back to military intervention, what we need to do is what we did when we fought wars to win them. We need to decide if we should be fighting, and if we can. Then we need to go in and win. Not tie. Not do some. Not hope. We're building a bridge to the future. And just like in bridge-building, you don't build half a bridge and hope someone on the other side will build a half that matches yours; you build a whole bridge. Then, after it's complete, if you want to give it away or sell it, you can do so.
In World War II, we didn't fight part of a war. We didn't go in telling Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan "we're going to fight you, but only until 1944." We fought to win, and only after our enemies surrendered unconditionally did we stop fighting. Then, after the peace treaties were signed, we didn't go into Germany and remove half the Luftwaffe; we didn't go into Japan and remove half of the Diet. We removed the entire governments and installed military governors (well, we shared responsibility for Germany with our allies). We ran the country until we were confident Japan could be a peaceful, self-ruling country, and only then did we allow them to form a new government. Ditto the Philippines after the Spanish-American War. Even the South after the Civil War; we didn't remove Jefferson Davis while leaving the Confederate Congress intact.
And I think that's the example of what we did wrong in Iraq. During the first Gulf War, we decided we didn't have the will or strength or resources to fight a proper war in Iraq, so we didn't even start. We sent in troops to free Kuwait, did so, and stopped at the border. This time, however, we sent troops into Iraq, we took out part of the government, but we held back. We knocked down the statue of Saddam Hussein, but didn't allow our troops to raise the Stars and Stripes over Baghdad. We stripped out Hussein's political party, but we didn't disband the Iraqi government. We tried to go only part of the way, and then hoped that the pieces we'd left would expand to fill the vacuums we'd caused. But of course there were other people with other ideas, who were eager for us to take out Hussein so that they could spread into those power vacuums. And now we're stuck, with half a bridge to Iraq's future, struggling against those who seek not to build the other half, but to knock our half down.
When we send troops into foreign countries to "help", they meet with resistance not only from "insurgents", or the bad guys, but from non-combatant citizens who bristle at the culture clash. And our troops wind up not only fighting the enemy, but struggling to not piss off the locals. It's an untenable situation.
When we send troops into battle, they should have only one, clear goal: to win. After they achieve total victory, then we can be magnanimous. Then we can go about setting up a local civilian-run government. But if all we want to do is send in policemen, we should be sending policemen, not trained, armed, fighting men.
It seems pretty clear to me that every time we try to fight half a war, we lose, but every time we go in fighting a total war, intent on victory and nothing less, we have a pretty good record of success. Maybe we need to choose our wars more carefully, rather than hoping our soldiers will move carefully once they're there.
Earlier this week, President Obama announced an increase in the number of troops we'll be sending to Afghanistan, but he also announced that they'll be there for a limited time. To me, it sounds like we're throwing away lives because we have to be seen as trying to do something, but we're going to limit those losses calendrically. It's like saying to the enemy, "Okay, we're going to fight. But if you can hold us off for this long, you win."
He used the term "nation building", of which Washington seems to have grown fond. It makes for a nice analogy, when you consider home building. But it would work better if the political cognoscenti using it actually thought about building a house.
What happens when you decide to build a house? First, you plan, hire an architect, design what it will look like, make sure the infrastructure is there (roads, sewers, electricity, etc.), and that the new materials and labor are available. And once the planning is done, then what? Then you clear the land—cut down trees that are in the way, remove inconvenient boulders, and dig a hole for the foundation. And, if there's already a ramshackle house on the property—something with holes in the roof, that's falling down, and that you really didn't want to live in in the first place—you knock it down. You don't say "I like this bedroom, so I'll keep it, and this foyer is nice, and I like that six-foot section of the basement." You knock down the whole thing, clear the land (just like erasing a blackboard before starting a new lesson), and start fresh.
Analogizing back to military intervention, what we need to do is what we did when we fought wars to win them. We need to decide if we should be fighting, and if we can. Then we need to go in and win. Not tie. Not do some. Not hope. We're building a bridge to the future. And just like in bridge-building, you don't build half a bridge and hope someone on the other side will build a half that matches yours; you build a whole bridge. Then, after it's complete, if you want to give it away or sell it, you can do so.
In World War II, we didn't fight part of a war. We didn't go in telling Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan "we're going to fight you, but only until 1944." We fought to win, and only after our enemies surrendered unconditionally did we stop fighting. Then, after the peace treaties were signed, we didn't go into Germany and remove half the Luftwaffe; we didn't go into Japan and remove half of the Diet. We removed the entire governments and installed military governors (well, we shared responsibility for Germany with our allies). We ran the country until we were confident Japan could be a peaceful, self-ruling country, and only then did we allow them to form a new government. Ditto the Philippines after the Spanish-American War. Even the South after the Civil War; we didn't remove Jefferson Davis while leaving the Confederate Congress intact.
And I think that's the example of what we did wrong in Iraq. During the first Gulf War, we decided we didn't have the will or strength or resources to fight a proper war in Iraq, so we didn't even start. We sent in troops to free Kuwait, did so, and stopped at the border. This time, however, we sent troops into Iraq, we took out part of the government, but we held back. We knocked down the statue of Saddam Hussein, but didn't allow our troops to raise the Stars and Stripes over Baghdad. We stripped out Hussein's political party, but we didn't disband the Iraqi government. We tried to go only part of the way, and then hoped that the pieces we'd left would expand to fill the vacuums we'd caused. But of course there were other people with other ideas, who were eager for us to take out Hussein so that they could spread into those power vacuums. And now we're stuck, with half a bridge to Iraq's future, struggling against those who seek not to build the other half, but to knock our half down.
When we send troops into foreign countries to "help", they meet with resistance not only from "insurgents", or the bad guys, but from non-combatant citizens who bristle at the culture clash. And our troops wind up not only fighting the enemy, but struggling to not piss off the locals. It's an untenable situation.
When we send troops into battle, they should have only one, clear goal: to win. After they achieve total victory, then we can be magnanimous. Then we can go about setting up a local civilian-run government. But if all we want to do is send in policemen, we should be sending policemen, not trained, armed, fighting men.
It seems pretty clear to me that every time we try to fight half a war, we lose, but every time we go in fighting a total war, intent on victory and nothing less, we have a pretty good record of success. Maybe we need to choose our wars more carefully, rather than hoping our soldiers will move carefully once they're there.
